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Abstract
This paper analyses the general equilibrium implications of reforming pay-as-you-go pension
systems in an economy with heterogeneous agents, human capital investment and capital-skill
complementarity. It shows that increasing funding delivers in the long run higher physical and
human capital and therefore higher output, but also higher wage and income inequality. The
latter affects preferences over the degree of redistribution of e remaining pay-as-you-go
component: despite the greater role that edistribution could perform in the new steady state,
we find a preference for lower redistribution for a larger group of the population.
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acknowledged.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The discussion over the problems of traditional pay-as-you-go pension systems and on how
to change them is by now a long standing one.
A considerable amount of conceptual and empirical work has been directed to identify
alternative reform proposals and their impact on diﬀerent economic variables1. Whatever
the speciﬁc institutional features of these alternative proposals, most of them include
some degree of funding. The claimed advantages of introducing or increasing funding
with respect to parametric reforms which would maintain the pay-as-you-go nature of
traditional social security systems range from higher returns and higher savings to fewer
labour market distortions and lower political pressure (see for instance Feldstein, 1998).
Given the general attractiveness of funding, the main concerns stem from transitional2,
risk3 and redistributive issues and from the political feasibility of such a change4.
Although, according to Gruber and Wise (2002), to redistribute income or to maintain
income redistribution is among the four economic goals which a reform should pursue5,
the economic literature on pension reform deals only marginally with intragenerational
redistribution. Namely, when considering redistributive issues, it focuses almost exclu-
sively on the intergenerational redistribution generated by an increase in funding either
during the transition period or in the long run6. Redistribution within generations is
sometimes taken into account by models considering the transition to a fully funded sys-
tem (see for instance Brunner, 1996 and Feldstein and Liebman, 2002) but it is seldom a
long run issue. The absence of an explicit theoretical analysis of the long run intragenera-
tional redistributive implications of introducing more funding7 is even more critical if one
takes into account that, starting from the World Bank (1994) proposal of a three-pillar
social security system, the funded component is almost always accompanied by a public,
1See for instance Diamond (1998 and 2002) and Sass and Triest (1997).
2When considering prefunding of social security, the transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded
system is a critical issue and has been the subject of substantial analysis (see for instance Breyer, 1989;
Homburg, 1990; Feldstein, 1998).
3For references on risk issues, one has to distinguish between funding via individual accounts and via a
unique trust fund. See for instance Diamond and Geanakoplos (2001) and Campbell and Feldstein (2001).
4See for instance Conesa and Krueger (1999), Cooley and Soares (1999), Leers et al. (2001); Sinn and
Uebelmesser (2002).
5The others being to correct the ﬁnancial imbalance, to increase national saving and to strengthen
economic eﬃciency.
6Van Groezen et al. (2002) can be interpreted in this light.
7Casarico (1998) is an exception we are aware of. Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2002) simulate the general equilibrium
eﬀects of privatising the US Social Security system under agents’ heterogeneity. Huggett and Ventura
(1999) perform steady state comparisons of the intragenerational redistributive eﬀects of introducing a
two-tier system for the US economy maintaining its pay-as-you-go structure.
1mandatory, pay-as-you-go pillar which should take care of redistributive concerns either
via beneﬁt ﬂoors, minimum income guarantees or ﬂat universal beneﬁts.
This paper tries to ﬁll the gap by analysing the general equilibrium implications of
introducing funding in an economy where there is a pay-as-you-go partially redistributive
pension system. It focuses on the intragenerational conﬂicts that this reform generates
both in the short and in the long run and it studies whether the redistribution performed
via the reduced pay-as-you-go pillar is subject to growing pressures for a reduction or
an increase in size. The analysis sheds some light on the compatibility between (private)
funding and (public) redistribution which is taken for granted by the current policy debate.
We model a two-period OLG closed economy characterised by agents’ heterogeneity,
human capital investment and capital-skill complementarity. A standard result in the
literature on social security is that, in steady state, savings are higher under a fully
funded pension scheme rather than under a pay-as-you-go one (Diamond, 1965). Under
the assumption that workers are perfect substitutes8, which is common to all the literature
on pension reform, an increase in funding, by driving savings up, delivers a higher level
of capital stock and higher real wages for all in the new steady state, for a given ratio
between the productivity of any two types of workers. The assumption of capital-skill
complementarity implies that policy variables aﬀecting physical capital inﬂuence across
group inequality: namely, changes in the size of the pay-as-you-go system, by modifying
capital, also change across group inequality bringing about new issues in the analysis of
pension system reforms. The inclusion of an education decision responds to the need of
integrating the analysis of the long run implications of pension reform on physical capital
to those on human capital and it oﬀers an endogenous mechanism to oﬀset changes in
across group inequality.
We ﬁnd that a social security reform based on an increase in funding delivers a higher
steady state level of physical and human capital and a higher wage inequality. This is new
to the literature on social security reform: with capital-skill complementarity not only
pension gaps but also wage gaps widen, adding to the redistributional problems generated
by the switch to funding. If we explicitly account for the preferences over redistribution
of heterogeneous agents, we ﬁnd that the cut in the payroll tax rate, which represents an
increase in funding as we will clarify in Section 3, generates in the short run an increase
in the desired amount of redistribution for people whose wage is below the average. When
the eﬀects of capital-skill complementarity kick in from time t + 1 onwards, groups’ sizes
and preferences over redistribution change. Funding increases the party of those who are
against redistribution in the public pay-as-you-go scheme, despite the greater role it could
perform. The higher inequality observed in the long run goes with a preference for lower
8Once productivity diﬀerentials are adjusted.
2redistribution for a larger group of the population.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the basic economic set-up. Section
3 analyses the impact of the social security reform and Section 4 concludes, suggesting
some policy implications of our ﬁndings.
2 The basic set-up
2.1 Consumers and government
We consider a two period overlapping generations model (OLG) of a closed economy.
When young, agents consume and can either invest in education and work as skilled
workers (type H agents) or they can work as unskilled workers (type L agents). Agents
diﬀer in their ability to acquire skills: cj denotes the time required to become skilled and
it is distributed on the interval [0,1] with continuous density function ϕ(·); the more able
the agent is, the less time he has to spend investing in human capital, the lower are his
foregone earnings9. When old, agents retire and ﬁnance their second period consumption
out of their savings and pensions.
























represent consumption of agent j born at time t respectively when young and old; β is
t h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ;rt+1 denotes the interest rate at time t +1a n dy
j
t represents
lifetime income of agent j born at time t which we next specify.
The government operates a balanced pay-as-you-go pension scheme: it collects contri-
butions proportional to wages at a rate τt and it pays per capita pensions p
j
t+1 which are





tαt + pt+1 (2)
9We do not investigate here the implications of imperfect capital markets on the decision to invest
i nh u m a nc a p i t a la n do nt h er e d i s t r i b u t i v ee ﬀects of a pension reform. This is done in Casarico (1998).
Notice however that assuming that education requires the payment of a monetary cost and that capital
markets on which agents have to borrow are imperfect would add further redistributive eﬀects which would
reinforce those generated by our model.
10The beneﬁtf o r m u l aa p p l i e dh e r ei su s e da l s oi nP e s t i e a u( 1 9 9 9 )i nas t e a d ys t a t ee n v i r o n m e n t .
3where n is the constant rate of population growth, w
j
t is the gross wage of agent j at
time t, αt is the contributory share of the scheme applying to generation t (the so-called
B i s m a r c k i a nf a c t o r ) ,w i t h0≤ αt ≤ 1 by assumption, and pt+1 is the redistributive com-
ponent of the system paid out at time t+1asaﬂat universal beneﬁt which is determined
according to the social security budget constraint. Namely:
pt+1 =( 1+n)[τt+1wt+1 − αtτtwt] −
g(τt)
2
(1 − αt)2 (3)
The ﬁrst term in square brackets represents per capita revenues collected at time t+1with
wt+1 denoting the average wage of the economy at time t + 1 yet to be determined. The
second term captures the share of per capita revenues required to ﬁnance the contributory
pensions. When αt = 0, the pension system is only redistributive; as αt increases, the
contributory share goes up. The last term represents the cost of redistribution: we assume
that the redistribution associated to the pension scheme implies a waste of resources which
is quadratic in the indicator of redistribution (1 − αt) and which depends on the size of
the scheme as measured by the contribution rate τt via a generic convex function g (·).11
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t if j ∈ L
where wH
t and wL
t represent the (gross) wage skilled and unskilled workers earn on the
labour market.





whose maximisation determines the decision to invest in human capital: it is convenient
to invest in human capital if yH
t ≥ yL
t . The last agent who ﬁnds proﬁt a b l et oi n v e s ti s
characterised by an education cost c∗









In order to determine w
j
t, we introduce production.
2.2 Production
To the best of our knowledge, all the existing literature on social security reform assumes
that workers are perfect substitutes, once productivity diﬀerentials are adjusted. It follows
11For an alternative representation of the distortionary costs associated to the non-contributory part of
the pay-as-you-go pension scheme which applies to a steady-state situation, see Casamatta et al. (2000).
4that a higher (lower) level of capital stock in the economy implies higher (lower) wages for
all types of workers, leaving relative wages unchanged. In fact, since the seminal work by
Griliches (1969), a large body of empirical studies ﬁnds that capital - and technological
progress embodied in new investments - better substitutes unskilled labour than skilled
labour12.










where Yt is production, Kt is physical capital, Lt =
R 1
c∗
t ϕ(c)dc is unskilled labour, Ht =
R c∗
t
0 (1−cj)ϕ(c)dc is the eﬀective supply of skilled labour, all at time t; δ, b and θ ∈ (0,1).
In (6), the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labour
σKH = 1, while the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labour σKL =
1
1−θ. Under the condition that θ is strictly greater than zero, σKL >σ KH and the
production function exhibits capital-skill complementarity.











and competitive skilled and unskilled wages are:
wH
t =( 1 − δ)
h
bKθ






t = δ (1 − b)
h
bKθ







Deﬁne the wage-premium as the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers’ wages:
zt ≡
(1 − δ)
δ (1 − b)
h
bKθ




An easy to verify implication of capital-skill complementarity is that ∂zt
∂Kt > 0, i.e. the
relative productivity of skilled labour is increasing in the amount of capital and so is
12For instance, Flug and Hercowitz (2000) use data from a wide range of countries and ﬁnd evidence
that investment in equipment raises the relative demand for skilled labor; similar results are reported
by Goldin and Katz (1998), Prasad (1994) and by a number of microeconomic studies, as surveyed in
Hamermesh (1993). Krusell et al. (2000) estimate the parameters of a four-factor model using US time-
series data and ﬁnd that the elasticities of substitution between capital equipment and skilled/unskilled
labour are consistent with capital-skill complementarity. Here we use the simplifying assumption that
there is only one type of physical capital as in Stokey (1996). For additional evidence and references on
capital-skill complementarity and capital-embodied skill-biased technological change see, among others,
Acemoglu (2000) and Katz and Autor (1999).
13See Uzawa (1988), chapter 5 for a detailed discussion.
5across group inequality in a competitive labour market. In the presence of capital-skill
complementarity policy variables aﬀecting the stock of capital do also change across group




t and rt, consumption, savings and investment plans must be consistent in
the goods and capital markets. Focusing on the clearing condition in capital markets, the
savings of the young must ﬁnance the stock of capital for the next period. In aggregate








t(c) denotes the optimal level of savings of an agent whose cost of investing in
education is given by c and S∗ is aggregate saving14. The equilibrium of the economy is
therefore represented by the solution to problem (1), by factor prices (7) and (8) and by
the capital market equilibrium condition (10). We now focus on the eﬀects of a social
security reform on the equilibrium of the economy, assuming that existence, uniqueness
and stability are satisﬁed.
3 Social security reform
Using the model above, we want to study the general equilibrium eﬀects of a reform to the
social security system. The policy change we consider is represented by a reduction in the
size of the pay-as-you-go pension scheme τt. As long as there are no liquidity constraints
and mandatory saving through a fully funded scheme is a perfect substitute for private
voluntary savings, a reduction in τt can be used to represent the introduction of some
funding in the pension system15. We assume that the reduction in τt is once and for all
and that it translates into lower pensions for the old at t and we concentrate on the general
equilibrium eﬀects of this change16.
14Notice that s
∗






t ,r t+1,c,α t,τt). To save notation, in the text we drop all the
variables but c.
15For instance, the 2001 pension reform in Germany cut not only the promised beneﬁts but also the
contribution rate to the pay-as-you-go scheme and encouraged private savings with ﬁscal means in order
to build up a partially funded system.
16The reason why we do not focus on alternative ways to ﬁnance the switch to more funding is that we
want to concentrate on and identify further intragenerational redistributive eﬀects of increasing funding
beyond those associated with the distribution of the costs of the transition. As we highlighted in the
introduction, the latter are already analysed in the existing literature. Assuming that the switch to funding
63.1 Policy change: eﬀects at t















If we focus on time t, a reduction in τt implies higher net wages for all, while gross
wages and the stock of physical and human capital are unchanged. K∗
t depends on S∗
t−1:
the latter is not aﬀected by the cut in payroll taxes. If the stock of physical capital is
given at t, gross wages do not change and therefore the decision to invest in education
mirrors that at time t − 1, leaving the stock of human capital unaﬀected.
3.2 Policy change: eﬀects at t +1a n di nt h es t e a d ys t a t e








∂τt > 0 and
∂zt+1
∂τt < 0. The
steady state SS after the reduction in τt is characterised by: K∗




t >r SS and z∗
t <z SS.
The higher level of savings associated with a (partially) funded scheme is such that the
amount of physical capital is higher than that observed before the policy change17.T h i si n
turns translates into higher output and lower interest rates. The presence of capital-skill
complementarity and of an education decision adds further implications to the switch to
more funding: ﬁrst, the higher level of physical capital brings about an increase in the wage
premium and therefore it raises across group inequality18.T h i si sn e wt ot h el i t e r a t u r eo n
social security reform which, when allowing for agents’ heterogeneity, uniformly assumes
perfect substitutability among workers, once adjusted for productivity diﬀerentials. The
association between more funding and more wage inequality sharpens the redistributional
problems associated to this reform. Namely, the reduction in τt implies that the amount
of resources which can potentially be devoted to redistributive purposes shrinks19.T h i s
is often highlighted in the policy debate where concerns are raised on how to maintain
redistribution once an investment-based social security system is adopted. Indeed, the
more actuarial the system is, the larger the gap between the pensions received by those
implies lower pensions for the old means that all the costs of the transition are on them. Given that the
paper does not focus on whether switching to funding represents a Pareto-improvement, the assumption
seems innocuous.
17This is a well-known result which dates back to Diamond (1965). Given that we assume the costs of the
policy change to be borne by the old, there is no issue on how the transition aﬀects capital accumulation.
By the same token, in the absence of any means-testing of the redistributive component of the scheme,
there is no saving moral hazard and therefore the Diamond’s result applies. Recent evidence on Chile
seems to conﬁrm that funding increases household saving [Coronado (2002)].
18This follows immediately from the assumption of capital-skill complementarity in Section 2.2.
19We are not interested in cases where the ineﬃciency of the pay-as-you-go scheme as measured by the
cost
g(τt)
2 (1 − αt)
2 is so large as to oﬀset the direct eﬀe c to fac u ti nτt.
7who are at the top and at the bottom of the income distribution. With capital-skill
complementarity not only pension gaps but also wage gaps widen, reinforcing the increase
in across group inequality. Second, the increase in the wage premium caused by the higher
level of physical capital induces more people to invest in education, which in turn raises
the level of human capital of the economy. The endogenous response of the education
decision reduces yet not cancels the initial rise in wage inequality.
Summarising, an increase in funding delivers not only higher physical but also human
capital. However, it also raises the wage premium generating higher inequality. The latter
is not compensated by higher redistribution which, for given α, is actually automatically
reduced in size via the lower amount of resources devoted to the partially redistributive
pay-as-you-go system.
If one examines the social security reform proposals advanced in the last years, one
sees that most of them tend to associate higher funding -possibly via private individual
accounts- with small public redistributive pay-as-you-go schemes. Maintaining the as-
sumption that redistribution takes place via ﬂat universal beneﬁts and using the notation
of our paper, the new system can be characterised by τSS = τmin and αSS <α t so as
to compensate for the reduction in the total amount of resources collected by the public
scheme, or in the limit αSS =0 .
In the next section we allow αt to change and we study the interaction between the
increase in funding and the contributory/redistributive components in the reduced pay-
as-you-go scheme. The analysis throws some light on if and how distributional concerns
can be taken care of in the new steady state.
3.3 Preferred α
As clariﬁed above, αt denotes how large the contributory portion of the pension scheme
is. Namely, it determines the fraction of the pension of the old at time t +1w h i c h
depends on the contributions they have paid at t and therefore on their past earnings; the
remaining part reﬂects the average contributions in the economy20. The higher αt,t h e
less the pension scheme redistributes resources across heterogeneous agents belonging to
the same generation. Given agents’ heterogeneity, the preferred αt diﬀers across agents.
If we deﬁne the preferred αt as the one maximising agents’ lifetime income at time t,w e














20Notice that αt does not aﬀect the pension of those who are old at time t.
8The preferred α
∗j
t depend on the size of the social security scheme via τt
g(τt), on the constant
rate of population growth and on the diﬀerence between one’s wage and the average one.
The favourite α
∗j




























where 0 ≤ αL
t <α
j
t < 1, b c
j
t is such that wH
t (1 − b c
j
t)=wt and the average wage is:
wt = wH
t ht(1 − ct)+wL







Unskilled agents belonging to group L prefer a lower αt than skilled agents H.N o t i c e




t ), though skilled,
want a positive level of redistribution: high-cost skilled agents, i.e. those whose wage is
below the mean and whose group from now on we denote by HB ∈ H want α
j
t < 1b e c a u s e
they beneﬁt from redistribution.
3.3.1 Preferred α and social security reform
We now analyse how changes in the size of the pay-as-you-go scheme aﬀect the preferred
contributory/redistributive share of the beneﬁt formula in the system itself. We focus ﬁrst
on what happens at time t and t + 1 and discuss then the steady state.



















> 0i ﬀ w
j
t − wt < 0
The favourite Bismarckian factor at time t decreases for those whose wage is below the
average: people belonging to group L and HB want a higher level of redistribution as τt
goes down. People in group
¡
H − HB¢
still want to set α
∗j
t =1 , i.e. the corner solution
i ss t i l lt h eo p t i m a lo n e 21. In Figure 1 we represent α
∗j
t as a function of the cost to invest
in education ct. α
∗j
t is a linear decreasing function of ct and it has two ﬂat portions at
1a n da tαL
t , as one can see looking at (11) and (12). When τt decreases, α
∗j
t moves
21Notice that if we had assumed g(τt)=τt, there would be no eﬀect of changes in the size of the scheme
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Figure 2: Favourite Bismarckian factor at time t+1 
 downward from b c
j
t onwards showing an increased desire for redistribution of the low skill
and the high-cost high-skill people22. Notice that the dotted line in Figure 1 represents
the impact of a reduction in τt which would hold for any t in the absence of capital-skill
complementarity. The presence of the latter implies that the reduction in the size of
the pay-as-you-go scheme has general equilibrium implications which show up from t +1





in τt aﬀect the wage premium which in turn modiﬁes the decision to invest in education
and therefore the size of the H, HB and L groups.















The ﬁrst inequality says that the reduction in the size of the pay-as-you-go system raises the
amount of redistribution that the next generation unskilled agents want: they desire a more
redistributive formula within the smaller pay-as-you-go scheme. The general equilibrium
eﬀect that the introduction of some funding has on the wage premium reinforces the direct




Bismarckian component is, a fortiori, equal to 1. It follows that the distance between the
favourite degrees of redistribution for the two groups increases. Notice also that these two
groups are not ﬁxed in size: as mentioned in the previous section, the number of skilled
agents goes up because the higher skilled wage provides further incentives to invest in
education (second inequality); moreover, the agent whose wage coincides with the average





t as in Figure 1 and add the preferred α
∗j
t+1 (thick line), which
takes into account both the direct eﬀect of the tax cut and the eﬀect via capital-skill
complementarity.
Figure 2 highlights that the group that does not want any redistribution is now larger
whilst the group that wants the highest level of redistribution is smaller; it also points out
that the degree of redistribution desired by this last group increases. People belonging to
the HB group (those whose cost of education is between b ct+1 and c∗





∂τt is negative for some of them -those whose cost of education
is close to b ct+1- while for some others it is positive -those whose cost of education is closer
to c∗
t+1.T h eﬁrst want less while the second want more redistribution. For this last group,
22In Figure 1 we denote by the time subscript (t − 1) the value of the variables before the tax decrease.
23See the Appendix.
10the eﬀect through capital-skill complementarity reinforces the direct one while for the ﬁrst
group it is opposite in sign24.
Summarising, in the short run (time t) the policy reform induces an increase in the
desired amount of redistribution for people whose wage is below the average. When the
eﬀects of capital-skill complementarity start to appear (from time t+1 onwards), groups’
sizes and preferences over redistribution change: namely, funding increases the party of
those who are against redistribution in the public pay-as-you-go scheme, while worsening
the relative position of those who beneﬁtted from it and making therefore redistribution
more necessary for them. The unskilled agentsp r e f e ral o w e rB i s m a r c k i a nf a c t o rb u to n l y
some of the high-cost high-skill people share their preferences: a wage below the average
does not guarantee a preference for higher redistribution in the new equilibrium.
These results depend on the higher level of physical capital generated by the increase
in funding and by capital-skill complementarity: given that, as shown in Section 3.2, more
funding at t delivers a higher steady state level of physical capital, they hold also in the
new steady state. The higher inequality observed in the long run goes with a preference
for lower redistribution for a larger group of the population.
As a concluding remark, notice that we here focus on a speciﬁc way to redistribute
income, that is, we use a ﬂat universal pension and we do not allow for any means-testing.
Future work should be directed to analyse whether the results reached here on preferences
over redistribution hold also in an environment where only those who pass a means-test
are entitled to receive the state beneﬁt. This would also require to tackle the moral hazard
issues both on the saving and on the education decision which means-testing introduces.
4 Conclusions
This paper analyses the general equilibrium eﬀects of increasing funding in an economy
with heterogeneous agents, capital-skill complementarity and human capital investment.
We show that more funding implies higher physical and human capital but also higher wage
and income inequality. This is new to the literature on social security reform which has so
far almost disregarded the long run intragenerational redistributive eﬀects associated to a
switch to funding. When preferences over redistribution are explicitly taken into account,
we ﬁnd that the cut in payroll taxes induces a short run increase in the desired amount of
redistribution in the smaller scheme. However, when capital skill complementarity starts
to bind, groups’ sizes and preferences over redistribution change and we show that the
24In the Appendix we show that α
j∗
t+1 can intersect α
j∗
t only in its downward sloping portion. This
implies that there must always be some agent belonging to the H
B group who wants more redistribution
than either in the initial equilibrium or at time t when only the direct eﬀe c ti sa tw o r k .
11higher wage and income inequality observed in the long run go with a preference for lower
redistribution for a larger group of the population.
These results deliver some policy implications for the current debate on reforming
partially redistributive pay-as-you-go systems. Most of the current social security reform
proposals involve an increase in funding. Higher funding implies more actuarial equivalence
between contributions and beneﬁts and it raises issues on how to take care of distributional
concerns in the new reformed system. Although there seems to be an agreement on
defending or strengthening the redistributive portion of the smaller remaining pay-as-you-
go pillar, the compatibility between (private) funding and (public) redistribution is always
taken for granted and never explicitly dealt with. The results of our paper show that,
indeed, a cut in the payroll tax rate increases the degree of redistribution maximising
agents want, with the exception of the low-cost high-skill people who do not want any
redistribution. If people were to vote over the amount of redistribution in the reformed
system and if the median voter had a wage below the average, we would indeed observe
higher funding accompanied by a higher degree of redistribution as the current policy
debate seems to envisage. The results of our paper suggest however that this is not the
end of the story: namely, both preferences and groups change over time due to the general
equilibrium eﬀects of the reform, which implies that the combination of higher funding
and higher redistribution in the smaller public pay-as-you-go scheme may be unstable.
Public redistribution and private funding may turn out to be at odds.
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Consider equation (11), (13) and (5) all at time t + 1. Substituting (13) in (11) and
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∂τt ≥ 0. Note that a change in τt aﬀects αL
t+1 through two channels.
The ﬁrst curly bracket captures the eﬀect of a change in Kt+1: a decrease in τt rises the
amount of physical capital at period t +1a n di ta ﬀects wages and, through capital-skill
complementarity, the wage premium and the skill composition of workers. The second
curly bracket is analogous to (14). If the cost function g(·) were linear, the second curly
bracket would disappear. In this case the reduction in αL
t+1 due to a cut in the pay-
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Looking at the agent whose education cost is b ct+1, (11) becomes α
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We prove by contradiction that α
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Using (5), e c − c∗


















. The term on the left hand side of the
inequality is always negative, while the right hand side is always non negative; therefore
we can conclude that it cannot be the case that e c>c ∗
t.
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